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ERADICATING ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE:
AN OPPORTUNITY LOST BY THE REVISED
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS
Steven Zeidman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Every day in criminal courts across the country, thousands of
people enter guilty pleas within hours of their arrest at their initial
appearance or arraignment before a judge.1 The practice is so rampant
that it has spawned its own phrase—“meet ‘em, greet ‘em, and plead
‘em”2—that derisively, but accurately, captures the routine. And while in
* Professor, CUNY School of Law; J.D., Duke University School of Law. As always, I
thank Mari Curbelo for her encouragement and critique.
1. While “arraignment” means different things in different jurisdictions, I am referring to
situations where someone is arrested and held in custody until his or her initial appearance before a
judge. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court held that the accused in that
situation must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of arrest. 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
New York’s Court of Appeals held that the New York State Constitution requires arraignment
within twenty-four hours of arrest. See People ex rel Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 225 (N.Y.
1991) (per curiam).
2. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 205 n.156
(2012) (“[C]ommentators have noted a tendency . . . for underresourced defense to plead too many
cases – a phenomenon deemed ‘meet ‘em, greet ‘em, and plead ‘em.’” (quoting Deborah L. Rhode,
Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1793 (2001))); Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla
Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 679
(2011) (“The literature is replete with accounts of attorneys who ‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em,’ i.e.,
advise their clients to plead guilty minutes after first meeting them in lock-up.” (citing Jenny
Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in
the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 181-82 (2009))); see also ROBERT C.
BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA BRINK, & MAUREEN DIMINO, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 31 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/
reports/misdemeanor (“In many jurisdictions, cases are resolved at the first court hearing, with
minimal or no preparation by the defense. . . . This process is known as meet-and-plead or plea at
arraignment/first appearance.”); Richard Klein, Judicial Misconduct in Criminal Cases: It’s Not
Just the Counsel Who May Be Ineffective and Unprofessional, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 203
(2006) (“[I]t is common for defense counsel in our large urban courts to offer a guilty plea on behalf
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many jurisdictions these are uncounseled pleas as defendants waive their
right to counsel or are simply not provided attorneys,3 in New York City,
where every person accused is provided with defense counsel, there
were still about 62,000 arraignment guilty pleas entered in 2015.4
To be sure, the majority of arraignment pleas stem from
misdemeanor charges. In 1972, the Supreme Court in Argersinger v.
Hamlin5 extended the Gideon6 right to counsel in felony cases to any
case where the accused faced the possibility of incarceration (practically
speaking, to misdemeanors).7 The Court decried the “assembly-line”
nature of misdemeanor practice8 and quoted a 1967 report by the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice:
An inevitable consequence of volume that large is the almost total
preoccupation in such a court with the movement of
cases. . . . Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual
defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting the facts at trial,
deciding the social risk he presents, or determining how to deal with
him after conviction. . . .
As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed: “Suddenly it becomes
clear that for most defendants in the criminal process, there is scant
concern for them as individuals. They are numbers on dockets, faceless
ones to be processed and sent on their way.[”]9

Clearly, the Court thought that establishing the right to a lawyer in
misdemeanor cases would have an impact on the processing system.
Unfortunately, the creation of the right has not cured the problem. Even
with lawyers present, and forty-five years after Argersinger’s

of their client within minutes of having first met the defendant.”).
3. See, e.g., Robert C. Boruchowitz, Fifty Years After Gideon: It Is Long Past Time to
Provide Lawyers for Misdemeanor Defendants Who Cannot Afford to Hire Their Own, 11 SEATTLE
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 891, 898 (2013) (“In many courts, there are no defenders at first court
appearances, and often even when they are present many defendants still proceed without
counsel.”). The indefensible practice of unrepresented defendants pleading guilty at initial
appearance is beyond the scope of this Article.
4. See N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 17 Exhibit 9 (2016),
http://www.nycja.org/library.php.
5. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32-33, 40.
8. Id. at 36 (“There is evidence of the prejudice which results to misdemeanor defendants
from this ‘assembly-line justice.’”).
9. Id. at 34-35 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 128 (1967)).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss1/14

2

Zeidman: Eradicating Assembly-Line Justice: An Opportunity Lost by the Rev

2017]

ERADICATING ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE

295

pronouncement, arraignment guilty pleas remain the single most
prominent and visible manifestation of assembly-line justice.10
In New York City, like most urban courts, the accused is most often
poor, male, and Black or Latino.11 After he’s arrested, he’s booked, or
processed at the precinct and, inter alia, questioned, photographed,
fingerprinted, searched, and held in a cell with numerous others enduring
the same process and facing a similar fate. Several hours later, he is
brought to court where he is placed in another holding cell waiting to
meet his government-appointed lawyer.
Approximately twenty hours have gone by since his arrest. He
likely has not been able to speak with his family. He has not slept, has
had at best very little to eat or drink, has not showered, brushed his teeth,
or even been able to wash his hands and splash water on his face.
Perhaps he has had access to a functioning toilet in one of the holding
cells. Eventually, his lawyer will speak briefly with him in a booth with
a plexiglass partition that prohibits even a perfunctory handshake and
renders it virtually impossible to see anything more than the outline of
each other’s face.
Soon thereafter, his case is called. The judge knows nothing about
the case except for the minimal factual recitation in the complaint, the
accused’s criminal history, and some basic information relative to
community ties regarding bail. The prosecutor assigned to arraignments
is unlikely to even be the same one who typed up the template charges
based on a brief interview (seldom conducted face-to-face) with the
arresting officer. At this critical moment in time, none of the institutional
players have engaged in any kind of factual or legal investigation of the
charges, or know much of anything about the defendant, the arresting
officer, or any potential victim or witnesses. And yet, the majority of
misdemeanor cases will end then and there.12
While all institutional players play significant roles in and bear
responsibility for the blight of meet, greet, and plead, this Article focuses
on defense counsel. Is defense counsel providing constitutionally
required effective assistance pursuant to the Sixth Amendment,13
10. See N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, supra note 4, at 17.
11. For example, the race or ethnicity of murder, rape, robbery, and shooting suspects is
overwhelmingly Black or Latino. See PREETI CHAUHAN ET AL., TRACKING ENFORCEMENT RATES
IN NEW YORK CITY 2003–2014, at 51-57 (2015), http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/News/
Enforcement_Rate_Report.pdf.
12. See N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, supra note 4, at 17.
13. The Sixth Amendment states as follows: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right
to counsel incorporates the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See McMann v. Richardson,
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and is defense counsel adhering to the standards of professional
behavior outlined in the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standards
for Criminal Justice?14
While a full discussion of the constitutionality of the defense
attorney’s arraignment plea advice is beyond the scope of this Article, it
must be noted that the Supreme Court is beginning to analyze the
requirements of effective assistance with respect to counseling clients
about guilty pleas. In Padilla v. Kentucky,15 the Court addressed a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of the defense
attorney’s advice regarding a guilty plea and potential deportation.
Broadly stated, Padilla requires that defense counsel provide adequate
advice about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea.16 Notably,
the Court did not carve out an exception if the lawyer practices in a highvolume criminal court, if the charges are comparatively minor, or if the
moment in time is at the accused’s initial arraignment or appearance
before a judge.
Can a defense attorney provide constitutionally adequate
immigration advice after only having just met her client? At that
moment in time, can a lawyer actually know her client’s immigration
status and the immigration consequences of a plea offer? “[I]n many
cases, the accused is unaware, uncertain, or even wrong about his
present immigration situation.”17
Defense counsel can seldom be sure after an initial interview that
she has an accurate picture of her client’s immigration situation.
Virtually every text and article written about the initial interview in
criminal cases, especially when it involves a free government-appointed
attorney, highlights the inherent distrust between client and lawyer.18 It
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating that “defendants facing felony chargers are entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel” and “defendants cannot be left to the mercies of
incompetent counsel”).
14. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2015).
15. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
16. See id. at 367-68.
17. Steven Zeidman, Gideon: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, Looking in the Mirror,
11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 933, 947 (2013).
18. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of Student
Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 890-91 (1996) (describing factors
related to client distrust of institutional indigent criminal defense attorneys); see also Gary
Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal
Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 74 (1986) (“[D]efendants often do not trust defense
counsel, particularly when the attorneys are public defenders or court appointees.”); Richard Klein,
The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 667 (1986) (“The defender needs to win
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takes time before someone charged with a crime will divulge sensitive
and potentially harmful information. Trust must be earned and
developed; it cannot happen in the typical five- or ten-minute prearraignment interview.
In addition, as the Court noted in Padilla, immigration law is fluid,
complex, and constantly changing.19 It is imprudent for defense counsel
to assume up-to-date knowledge of immigration law at any given
moment, and she should demand time to speak with experts, research the
law, and take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that she is fully
aware of the consequences of any plea. Given the Court’s explicit
reference to, and reliance on, ethical standards at the root of its holding
in Padilla,20 it is significant that the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice: Pleas of Guilty call for careful, time-consuming consideration of
plea offers.21 Standard 14-1.3(a) provides that “[a] defendant with
counsel should not be required to enter a plea if counsel makes a
reasonable request for additional time to represent the defendant’s
interests.”22 Post-Padilla, it seems that every request for additional time
made at the accused’s arraignment is presumptively “reasonable,” if
not compulsory.
The Supreme Court, in the companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper23
and Missouri v. Frye,24 again signaled constitutional concerns about the
nature and quality of defense counsel’s advice to her client concerning
guilty pleas.25 The Court for the first time explicitly acknowledged that
guilty pleas are the primary method of resolving criminal cases and
applied the effective assistance standard to plea bargaining.26 Justice
Scalia in his dissent predicted a flurry of plea bargaining litigation as
courts are confronted with questions about the nature and quality of
counsel’s advice, how much fact and legal investigation preceded the
advice, how much time the accused was given to consider the

over the trust and confidence of the defendant, but the hurried attorney anxiously wishing to
conclude the interview so that he can go to the next court and see other defendants, is not likely to
invite and encourage his client’s trust.” (footnote omitted)).
19. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360-64, 369.
20. Id. at 366-68.
21. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.3(a) & cmt. at
25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999).
22. Id. Standard 14-1.3(a).
23. 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
24. 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
25. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169; Frye, 566 U.S. at 143.
26. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170 (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials.”).
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advice, etcetera.27 Subsequent cases will surely demand more from
defense counsel than a brief initial interview before advising a client to
plead guilty.
If post-Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, arraignment guilty pleas are of
questionable constitutional validity, it is imperative that such pleas be
condemned by the Standards of professional behavior. While it is sad but
true that a defense attorney’s conduct could be constitutional and yet in
violation of the Standards, it must never be the case that conduct could
be unconstitutional yet consistent with the Standards.
Further, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice are becoming
more directly relevant when courts consider whether counsel provided
constitutionally required effective assistance. After many years of
minimizing the impact of the Standards when analyzing whether an
attorney’s performance met constitutional muster,28 the Supreme Court
now seems more inclined to take the Standards into active consideration
and almost imbue them with constitutional heft.29 In Frye, after deciding
27. Id. at 175-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427-28 (1986) (“[O]ur interpretive duties go
well beyond deferring . . . to the subconstitutional recommendations of even so esteemed a body as
the American Bar Association.”); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing
norms of practice as reflected in the American Bar Association standards . . . are guides to
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.”).
29. There are many examples of cases where the Court cited the ABA Standards in support of
its holding. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2003) (“Counsel’s decision not to
expand their investigation . . . fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in
1989.”); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322-23, 323 n.50 (2001) (noting that “competent defense
counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised” the defendant
about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea). Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, one of
the architects of the ABA Standards, believed the Standards had a place in the Court’s constitutional
analyses. See Warren E. Burger, Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 251, 253 (1974) (“[T]he Justices of the Supreme Court and hundreds of other
judges . . . consult the Standards and make use of them whenever they are relevant.”). Several
scholars suggest that the Court is increasingly incorporating the standards into constitutional
questions. See, e.g., Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 418 n.40 (2013) (“In addition to fleshing out the meaning of
constitutional principles in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court may also invite nonjudicial
institutions to help give meaning to constitutional principles through their own regulatory processes.
For example, in the Court’s recent ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence, it has announced
with ever-increasing clarity that it will look to ‘codified standards of professional practice,’
including American Bar Association Guidelines, in determining whether a defense attorney’s
performance falls below a constitutionally acceptable baseline.” (quoting Frye, 566 U.S. at
145)); Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test
for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77, 97 (2007) (arguing that “the Court has
given teeth to the test for ineffective assistance” by beginning to use ABA Standards “as a means to
measure a lawyer’s performance in death penalty cases”); Roberts, supra note 2, at 161 (“Although
professional standards on their own may not adequately affect defense-counsel behavior, such
standards are also woven into the constitutional landscape.”).
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that the requirements of effective assistance also applied to counsel’s
plea bargaining performance, the Court trenchantly observed the
following: “The inquiry then becomes how to define the duty and
responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargain process. This is a
difficult question.”30 While the Court decided to kick this “difficult
question” down the road, it specifically noted that the ABA Standards
should serve as “important guides.”31
As courts look to the ABA Standards to define the parameters of
effective assistance in the plea bargaining context, it is essential that
the Standards take every occasion to finally, clearly, directly and
unequivocally condemn meet, greet, and plead.
This Article examines the latest incarnation of the ABA Standards
for the Defense Function adopted in 201532 and its impact on meet,
greet, and plead. Revising the Standards is an onerous task.33 The last
update of the Defense Function Standards was in 1993.34 That reality
highlights the need to get it right; it will likely be many years before the
Standards are revisited. The revisions presented an opportunity, if not a
necessity, to make clear that defense counsel should not recommend to a
client that he accept a guilty plea at arraignment, and that counsel should
advise a client more affirmatively to reject any guilty plea offered at
arraignment.35 In the final analysis, the new Standards send mixed
messages and are a lost opportunity to finally rid the criminal justice
system of the very symbol of assembly-line justice.

30. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143-45.
31. Id. at 145 (“This case presents neither the necessity nor the occasion to define the duties
of defense counsel in those respects, however.”).
32. See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
33. See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of
Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10, 14-15.
34. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1993, amended 2015).
35. At the outset, it is important to distinguish between first appearances where client and
counsel have had adequate time to meet and talk, versus the typical situation involving an indigent
defendant and a public defender who likely just met for the first time minutes before the actual first
appearance in front of a judge. Arraignment pleas are, obviously, much less of a problem in
situations where client and lawyer have had ample time to talk (in addition, the lawyer in those
situations very often has had time to conduct at least a preliminary factual and legal investigation)—
those scenarios cannot rightly be characterized as “meet, greet and plead.” See NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 30-31.
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THE ABA DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS

There are more than forty Standards with numerous sections and
subsections in the Defense Function Standards, and many of them
implicate guilty pleas at arraignments.36 But ultimately there is one
carefully tucked away key sentence regarding guilty pleas at
arraignments. While the previous incarnation of the Standards seemed to
address and frown upon defense counsel recommending a guilty plea at
any time without having first engaged in fact and legal investigation, the
new Standards finally refer specifically to guilty pleas at “first
appearance,” as well as to counsel’s affirmative duty to “advise against”
those pleas.37
Standard 4-6.1 (Duty to Explore Disposition Without Trial)
provides in section (b) as follows:
In every criminal matter, defense counsel should consider the
individual circumstances of the case and of the client, and should not
recommend to a client acceptance of a disposition offer unless and
until appropriate investigation and study of the matter has been
completed. Such study should include discussion with the client and an
analysis of relevant law, the prosecution’s evidence, and potential
dispositions and relevant collateral consequences. Defense counsel
should advise against a guilty plea at the first appearance, unless, after
discussion with the client, a speedy disposition is clearly in the client’s
best interest.38

The new Standard 4-6.1(b) contains the very first explicit reference
to guilty pleas at arraignment or “first appearance,” and, as a result,
takes on heightened significance.39 It begins by considering when it is
appropriate for counsel to recommend to a client that he accept a guilty
plea offer, and dictates that counsel should not so recommend unless and
until she has completed appropriate investigation and study of the case.40
While the word “appropriate” seems to qualify the nature of the

36. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
4-1.1 to 4-9.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
37. Id. Standard 4-6.1(b).
38. Id.
39. Compare id., with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-6.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended 2015). In fact, given the significance
and prevalence of the practice of meet, greet, and plead, it might have been best addressed in a
separate and aptly titled Standard.
40. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
4-6.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
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investigation and study, it does not eliminate the need for such preadvice efforts.
Although the Standard states plainly that counsel “should not
recommend” a guilty plea unless she has concluded appropriate preadvice lawyering tasks, and does not include qualifiers such as “absent
rare and unusual circumstances,”41 it is noteworthy that the 1993 version
of this section began by stating in no uncertain terms, that “[u]nder no
circumstances” should counsel recommend acceptance of a guilty plea
offer unless such advice was preceded by appropriate investigation and
study of the case.42 The use of “under no circumstances” suggested that
any recommendation to accept a plea must be preceded by some
degree of investigation and study. By deleting such a strong and
unequivocal admonition, the new Standard sends a less powerful
message to defense counsel.
The new Standard 4-6.1 for the first time addresses when it is
appropriate for counsel to affirmatively advise a client to reject a guilty
plea offer at first appearance.43 What is the substantive difference
between not recommending a guilty plea and advising against a guilty
plea? Clearly, the drafters believed it was insufficient to provide solely
that lawyers should not recommend guilty pleas unless and until they
had completed appropriate investigation. It seems the new language was
meant to address the all too common reality of lawyers justifying
countless first appearance guilty pleas by saying, in effect, “I didn’t
recommend it—he wanted to cop out and get it over with.” The new
Standard instructs lawyers that their counseling responsibilities are not
satisfied by simply not recommending acceptance of a guilty plea offer;
their duties include specifically advising the client to reject a plea.44
While the Standard states plainly that counsel “should advise
against a guilty plea at the first appearance,” and does not use any
qualifiers such as “in most cases,” it provides that the direction for
counsel to advise against a quick guilty plea can be overridden if “a
speedy disposition is clearly in the client’s best interest.”45 The Standard
now gives with one hand and takes with the other—it is all too easy to
imagine attorneys acceding to arraignment pleas and claiming,

41. See id.
42. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
4-6.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended 2015).
43. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 46.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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repeatedly, that it was “clearly in the client’s best interest.”46 That is all
too facile an explanation for conduct that seems to run against the
current stream of effective assistance of counsel jurisprudence as well as
many of the Defense Function Standards themselves.
The phrase “clearly in the client’s best interest” is vague and
potentially vast. What exactly are those words meant to capture? How
clear must it be? How should a lawyer assess what is in her client’s best
interests, having just met her client, having just read the charges, and not
yet having engaged in any investigation and meaningful study of
the case?
This Standard most specifically presents a lost opportunity for the
ABA Standards to clearly and boldly confront assembly-line justice by
stating simply and eloquently, “[d]efense counsel should advise against a
guilty plea at the first appearance.”47 The use of the word “should” as
opposed to “must” provides sufficient space for defense counsel in rare
circumstances to choose not to advise the client to reject a plea offer.
It is crucial to keep in mind that the Standard addresses defense
counsel’s advising responsibility—ultimately it is, of course, the client’s
decision whether to accept or reject a plea offer.48 The Standards should
encourage defense counsel to take appropriate steps on behalf of each
client to provide and promote individualized and effective representation
as opposed to assembly-line justice. Despite the apparent intent of this
newly edited Standard, it will, I expect, be honored in the breach—
arraignment pleas will remain vast and common and yet in arguable
compliance with the Standard.
Many other Defense Function Standards directly or indirectly
implicate guilty pleas at first appearance or arraignment, and as a result
there is no clear guidance for practicing criminal defense lawyers.49
What follows in chronological fashion are comments on various other
recently revised Defense Function Standards, with a focus on how the
Standard affects guilty pleas at arraignment.

46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“It is also recognized that the accused has the
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.” (first citing Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1997) (Burger, C. J., concurring); and then citing STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS 4-5.2, 21-2.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993,
amended 2015)).
49. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standards 4-6.1 to 4-6.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
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A. General Standards
1. Standard 4-1.1: The Scope and Function of These Standards
Section (b) of this very first Defense Function Standard specifies
that the Standards are “intended to provide guidance” and are
“aspirational or describe ‘best practices,’” but that they “may be relevant
in judicial evaluation of constitutional claims regarding the right
to counsel.”50
Section (c) builds on the Standards “are aspirational” theme by
declaring that “the words ‘should’ or ‘should not’ are used . . . rather
than mandatory phrases such as ‘shall’ or ‘shall not,’ to describe the
conduct of lawyers that is expected or recommended.”51
While the Standards do not create substantive rights for the
accused,52 and the Supreme Court has said on many occasions that the
Standards are “guides” in the ineffective assistance of counsel context,53
why should this Standard set the bar so low? Why shouldn’t the
Standards do more than merely “provide guidance,” and if the Standards
are aspirational and meant to capture “best practices,” then why start off
by so purposefully and clearly limiting their impact?
Section (d) instructs defense counsel to consult other ABA
Criminal Justice Standards “for more detailed consideration of the
performance of criminal defense counsel in specific areas.”54
Most relevant here are the Pleas of Guilty Standards,55 last revised
in 1999, an obvious and necessary place to look when analyzing the
ethical responsibilities of counsel taking guilty pleas at arraignment or
initial appearance.56
2. Standard 4-1.2: Functions and Duties of Defense Counsel
Section (b) of Standard 4-1.2 specifies that among the “primary
duties” defense counsel owe to their clients is the duty “to ensure that
constitutional and other legal rights of their clients are protected; and to
render effective, high-quality legal representation.”57
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
1.1(d).
55.
56.
57.
1.2(b).

See id. Standard 4-1.1(b).
See id. Standard 4-1.1(c).
See id. Standard 4-1.1(b).
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999).
See infra Part III.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-
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How do arraignment guilty pleas comport with this standard? On
the contrary, pleas entered at the client’s first appearance, after defense
counsel met her client briefly for the first time moments before, reflect
little concern for constitutional rights. Basic constitutional questions
concerning the legality of the seizure, search, and arrest are left
unexamined, as are any inquiries about any interrogation or
identification procedures. It is telling that the New York City Police
Department’s rampant stop-and-frisk practices were condemned as
unconstitutional by a federal judge;58 the practice was barely examined
in New York City’s criminal courts.59
While the new Standard calls for “high-quality” representation,
could not even the aspirational bar be set higher? It is true that
commentators and even a Supreme Court Justice have opined that
defendants do not have a right to a “Cadillac” defense.60 The Standards,
however, should aim for excellence. Contrast the call for “high-quality”
with the language used in Standard 4-1.2(g) that counsel in death penalty
cases should make “extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused.”61
The ABA Standards should urge “extraordinary efforts” in all cases.
Section (c) provides that defense counsel “should know and abide
by the standards of professional conduct.”62
How then can any Standard in any way permit arraignment
guilty pleas, which, as will be discussed below,63 are contrary to
numerous Standards?
3. Standard 4-1.3: Continuing Duties of Defense Counsel
Section (h) of Standard 4-1.3 explicitly states that defense counsel
has an ongoing “duty to consider the collateral consequences of
decisions and actions, including but not limited to the collateral
consequences of conviction.”64
58. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
59. See generally Steven Zeidman, Whither the Criminal Court: Confronting Stops-andFrisks, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1187 (2012/2013).
60. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Kagan Says Poor Defendants Are Entitled to a ‘Ford Taurus’
Defense, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 19, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
kagan_says_poor_defendants_are_entitled_to_a_ford_taurus_defense.
61. Compare STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 4-1.2(b) (instructing defense counsel to provide “high-quality legal representation”), with
id. Standard 4-1.2(g) (instructing defense counsel in capital cases to “make extraordinary efforts on
behalf of the accused”).
62. Id. Standard 4-1.2(c).
63. See infra Part II.A.3–F.
64. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 41.3(h).
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In addition to the ever present potential immigration consequences
of a guilty plea, there are vast other disastrous effects that attach to a
conviction—a guilty plea can result in eviction, inability to obtain
loans, sex offender and domestic violence registration, and loss of
myriad licenses, “parental rights, public benefits, and employment
opportunities.”65 The awesome and time-consuming duty to consider the
full range of potential consequences cannot be effectively carried out in
time before an arraignment plea.66
4. Standard 4-1.5 Duty to Preserve the Record
Standard 4-1.5 states: “At every stage of representation, defense
counsel should take steps necessary to make a clear and complete record
for potential review.”67
The intent and purpose of this new Standard is clear, but
arraignment pleas serve instead to insulate and shield cases from any
meaningful review.
B. Access to Defense Counsel
1. Standard 4-2.3: Right to Counsel at First and Subsequent
Judicial Appearances
Standard 4-2.3 provides the following: “A defense counsel should
be made available in person to a criminally-accused person for
consultation at or before any appearance before a judicial officer,
including the first appearance.”68
It is indeed critical that defense counsel be made available inperson to the accused for consultation at or before any appearance before
a judicial officer, including the first appearance.69 However, the larger
question is what will those lawyers actually do? Providing counsel is “a
65. See Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2012).
66. But see id. at 1827 (“[C]ourts have held that neither the court nor counsel had a duty to
advise clients of collateral consequences at the time of a plea.”). Nevertheless, it is not unusual to
find cases where defense counsel was deemed to be ineffective for failing to provide adequate
advice about the impact of a guilty plea on matters like sex offender registration, Taylor v. State,
698 S.E.2d 384, 385, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), or parole eligibility, Pridham v. Commonwealth, No.
2008-CA-002190-MR, 2010 WL 4668961, at *1-2 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010).
67. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
4-1.5.
68. Id. Standard 4-2.3.
69. See, e.g., Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules Are Set to Change. Lawyers Say It’s
Unethical to Represent Some with So Little Time to Prepare, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 3,
2005, at E1 (discussing potential consequences associated with “pleading people out”).
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necessary but not sufficient step.”70 If the lawyers provided at initial
appearance simply enter guilty pleas, then they are little more than
window-dressing.71 Hence, there is a critical need for the Standards to
speak loudly, clearly, and uniformly against arraignment pleas.
C. Lawyer-Client Relationship
1. Standard 4-3.1: Establishing and Maintaining an Effective
Client Relationship
Section (a) of Standard 4-3.1 urges that “[i]mmediately upon
appointment or retention, defense counsel should work to establish a
relationship of trust and confidence with each client.”72
The use of the word “work” in the context of endeavoring to
establish the critical relationship between lawyer and client is tacit
recognition that developing such relationships, especially when counsel
is publicly appointed versus privately retained, takes time and effort. The
commentary to the comparable 1993 Standard refers to the need for
“early and frequent discussions” to help build that relationship “for
which defense counsel should strive.”73 Arraignment guilty pleas,
typically entered after brief client interviews, are hardly consistent with
this essential goal.
2. Standard 4-3.3: Interviewing the Client
Section (a) of Standard 4-3.3 provides that “[i]n the initial meeting
with a client, defense counsel should begin the process of establishing an
effective attorney-client relationship.”74
As noted in the commentary to Standard 4-3.1 above, an “effective
attorney-client relationship” does indeed require time.75 That
relationship typically cannot be, and is not, developed at the initial
70. Andrew Karmen, Poverty, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 25, 44 (William C.
Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000).
71. Lisa C. Wood et al., Meet-and-Plead: The Inevitable Consequence of Crushing Public
Defender Workloads, 42 LITIG. 20, 23-24 (2015).
72. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 43.1(a).
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.1
cmt. at 148-49 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended 2015).
74. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 43.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
75. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
4-3.1 cmt. at 148-49 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended 2015).
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meeting, especially one that lasts only a few minutes in the moments
before the client’s arraignment.76 The full text of section (a) describes
several important matters (for example, the client’s objectives,
evidentiary matters, and confidentiality) that lawyers should discuss with
their clients.77 These necessary conversations require, as contemplated
by section (b), multiple interviews.78
Section (b) states that “[c]ounsel should interview the client as
many times as necessary for effective representation, which in all but the
most simple and routine cases will mean more than once.”79
Here is where the Standards first capitulate to meet, greet, and
plead. Use of the phrase “simple and routine cases”80 provides an
opening for the meet, greet, and plead train to run through. With the
growth of collateral consequences, as reflected in the numerous
references to collateral consequences in these very Standards,81 there are
virtually no “simple and routine cases.” “[H]igh-quality” representation
mandates that counsel interview all of his or her clients as often as
possible, certainly “more than once.”82 The permission to hold just one
interview is especially troubling given the laundry list of important items
spelled out in sections (c)(i)–(viii) that defense counsel should review
with his or her client.83
Sections (c)(i)–(viii) provide a detailed list of all the matters
defense counsel should discuss with the client “[a]s early as practicable
in the representation.”84 Section (c)(i) provides that defense counsel
should “determine in depth the client’s view of the facts and other
relevant facts known to the client,”85 and section (c)(viii) specifies the
need to discuss “relevant collateral consequences resulting from the
current situation as well as from possible resolutions of the matter.”86
The list of matters to be discussed “[a]s early as practicable” is
significantly more detailed than the 1993 version of the Standard,
76. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
4-3.3(a)-(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
77. Id. Standard 4-3.3(a).
78. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
79. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 43.3(b).
80. Id. Standard 4-3.3(b).
81. See, e.g., id. Standards 4-1.3(h), 4-1.12(b), 4-3.3(c)(viii), 4-5.4, 4-6.1(b), 4-6.2(c), 46.3(e), 4-8.3(b), (h).
82. See id. Standards 4-1.2(b), 4-3.3(b).
83. Id. Standard 4-3.3(c)(i)–(viii).
84. Id. Standard 4-3.3(c).
85. Id. Standard 4-3.3(c)(i).
86. Id. Standard 4-3.3(c)(viii).
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thereby reflecting a more thorough understanding of all that must be
achieved in the client interview.87 Of particular significance is the
direction that defense counsel should “determine in depth the client’s
view of the facts” and discuss “relevant collateral consequences
resulting from the current situation.”88 It seems apparent that this
thoughtful and appropriate approach to the interview is at odds with one
quick interview that results in an even quicker guilty plea.
3. Standard 4-3.7: Prompt and Thorough Actions to Protect
the Client
Section (b) of Standard 4-3.7 provides as follows:
Defense counsel should promptly seek to obtain and review all
information relevant to the criminal matter, including but not limited to
requesting materials from the prosecution. Defense counsel should,
when relevant, take prompt steps to ensure that the government’s
physical evidence is preserved at least until the defense can examine or
evaluate it.89

Section (c) provides the following: “Defense counsel should work
diligently to develop, in consultation with the client, an investigative and
legal defense strategy, including a theory of the case. As the matter
progresses, counsel should refine or alter the theory of the case as
necessary, and similarly adjust the investigative or defense strategy.”90
Section (f) states: “For each matter, defense counsel should
consider what procedural and investigative steps to take and motions to
file, and not simply follow rote procedures learned from prior matters.”91
Once again, the list of “prompt and thorough” actions that defense
counsel should take reveals all that is required for the effective defense
of a criminal charge, and does not seem to contemplate, or even imagine,
an immediate guilty plea.
Section (f)’s call for defense lawyers to refrain from a “rote”
approach to lawyering speaks directly to the assembly-line nature of

87. Compare id. Standard 4-3.3(c) (instructing defense counsel to discuss, inter alia, relevant
facts, length of proceedings, sources of information, the client’s wishes, legal options, potential
outcomes, costs and benefits, and collateral consequences), with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended
2015) (instructing defense counsel to discuss relevant facts).
88. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 43.3(c)(i), (viii) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
89. Id. Standard 4-3.7(b).
90. Id.
91. Id. Standard 4-3.7(f).
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much of criminal defense practice,92 particularly the automatic
assumption that a case is readily disposable by a guilty plea. An early
study of public defenders found that most defined their task as defending
guilty clients, such that “[t]he situation is construed as ‘standard,’ and,
therefore, pre-established organizational routines can be executed.”93
One scholar described the way that public defenders quickly classify
cases into various “normal crimes” and resolve those cases according to
standard operating procedures.94 These routines and standard operating
procedures include a quick assessment of the going rate of a
misdemeanor case that in turn leads to ready acceptance of a plea offer
that conforms to that expectation.95
4. Standard 4-3.9: Duty to Keep Client Informed and Advised
About the Representation
Section (a) of Standard 4-3.9 provides that “[d]efense counsel
should keep the client reasonably and currently informed
about developments in and the progress of the lawyer’s services,
including developments in pretrial investigation, discovery, disposition
negotiations, and preparing a defense. Information should be
sufficiently detailed so that the client can meaningfully participate in
the representation.”96
Put simply, this Standard recognizes what should be obvious—
clients can only “meaningfully participate” if they receive sufficiently
detailed information from their lawyers.97 The commentary to the
comparable 1993 Standard refers to “anxious” clients, the difficulty in
establishing a relationship of trust and confidence, and the necessity and
benefits of making sure that clients are fully informed about all aspects
of their cases.98

92. Id.
93. Dennis R. Eckart & Robert V. Stover, Public Defenders and Routinized Criminal Defense
Procedures, 51 J. URB. L. 665, 677 (1974).
94. David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 260, 264-70 (1965).
95. See Zeidman, supra note 18, at 913-14, 914 n.253 (“For most institutional defenders,
learning what a case is ‘worth’ is a critical step toward developing competence. New cases are
compared with prior ones to determine whether a proposed offer approximates the norm and is
therefore acceptable.”).
96. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 43.9(a).
97. Id.
98. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.8
cmt. at 177 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended 2015).
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D. Investigation and Preparation
1. Standard 4-4.1: Duty to Investigate and Engage Investigators
Section (a) of Standard 4-4.1 states that “[d]efense counsel has a
duty to investigate in all cases, and to determine whether there is a
sufficient factual basis for criminal charges.”99
There is no exception for arraignment guilty pleas and that is as it
must be—counsel has a duty to investigate in all cases, no matter how
seemingly routine. The 1993 commentary refers appropriately to
investigation as “essential.”100 Even the Supreme Court has recognized
the indispensable nature of investigation.101
Section (b) pointedly makes clear that “[t]he duty to investigate is
not terminated by factors such as the apparent force of the prosecution’s
evidence, a client’s alleged admissions to others of facts suggesting
guilt, a client’s expressed desire to plead guilty or that there should be no
investigation, or statements to defense counsel supporting guilt.”102
As if speaking directly to the practice of arraignment guilty pleas,
this section mandates that counsel must engage in investigation even if
the client wishes to plead guilty and even if the client opposes
investigation, two of the most common rationales offered by defense
attorneys for entering guilty pleas at arraignments.103
Section (c) states:
Defense counsel’s investigative efforts should commence promptly
and should explore appropriate avenues that reasonably might lead to
information relevant to the merits of the matter, consequences of the
criminal proceedings, and potential dispositions and penalties.
Although investigation will vary depending on the circumstances, it
should always be shaped by what is in the client’s best interests, after
consultation with the client. Defense counsel’s investigation of the
merits of the criminal charges should include efforts to secure relevant
information in the possession of the prosecution, law enforcement
authorities, and others, as well as independent investigation. 104

99. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 44.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
100. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.2
cmt. at 183 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993, amended 2015).
101. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005).
102. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 44.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
103. See id.
104. Id. Standard 4-4.1(c).
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Again, there is no exception for arraignment guilty pleas. While the
nature of the investigation will necessarily “vary,” the obligation to
investigate is manifest.
E. Control and Direction of Litigation
1. Standard 4-5.1: Advising the Client
Section (b) of Standard 4-5.1 dictates:
Defense counsel should keep the client reasonably and regularly
informed about the status of the case. Before significant decisionpoints, and at other times if requested, defense counsel should advise
the client with candor concerning all aspects of the case, including an
assessment of possible strategies and likely as well as possible
outcomes. Such advisement should take place after counsel is as fully
informed as is reasonably possible in the time available about the
relevant facts and law. Counsel should act diligently and, unless time
does not permit, advise the client of what more needs to be done or
considered before final decisions are made.105

This section speaks deliberately and directly to the lawyer’s role as
advisor. It begins by making clear that the lawyer should advise the
client about “all aspects of the case” before any significant decisions
must be made, and that this advice should occur only after counsel has
become “fully informed” about the relevant facts and law.106 It is hard to
imagine otherwise.
And yet, inexplicably, the section takes pains to limit this basic and
crucial component of a lawyer’s job by providing that counsel’s
obligation to become fully informed about the relevant facts and law
may be dispensed with due to time constraints, and that, similarly,
counsel’s duty to advise about “what more needs to be done or
considered before final decisions are made” can be ignored if “time does
not permit.”107 By limiting the lawyer’s most basic advising functions
with vague notions of time constraints, this Standard seems to expressly
permit, if not condone, the hurried guilty pleas taken at arraignments.
Section (e) states that “[d]efense counsel should provide the client
with advice sufficiently in advance of decisions to allow the client to

105. Id. Standard 4-5.1(b).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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consider available options, and avoid unnecessarily rushing the accused
into decisions.”108
This section, in contrast to section (b), recognizes what should be
abundantly obvious—the accused should be provided with advice well
before having to make significant decisions so as to avoid hurried and
ill-considered decision-making.109 Arraignment guilty pleas are the very
embodiment of the rushed decisions expressly disfavored by this section.
2. Standard 4-5.4: Consideration of Collateral Consequences
Section (a) of Standard 4-5.4 provides the following:
Defense counsel should identify, and advise the client of, collateral
consequences that may arise from charge, plea or conviction. Counsel
should investigate consequences under applicable federal, state, and
local laws, and seek assistance from others with greater knowledge in
specialized areas in order to be adequately informed as to the existence
and details of relevant collateral consequences. Such advice should be
provided sufficiently in advance that it may be fairly considered in a
decision to pursue trial, plea, or other dispositions.110

This Standard, as with Standard 4-5.1(e) above, appropriately
recognizes that advice must be given “sufficiently in advance” so that
decisions, like the decision whether to accept or reject a plea offer, can
be “fairly considered.”111 The contrast with the quick and dirty
arraignment plea is obvious.
3. Standard 4-5.5: Special Attention to Immigration Status
and Consequences
Section (b) of Standard 4-5.5 provides the following: “If defense
counsel determines that a client may not be a United States citizen,
counsel should investigate and identify particular immigration
consequences that might follow possible criminal dispositions.
Consultation or association with an immigration law expert or
knowledgeable advocate is advisable in these circumstances.”112
Section (c) further provides the following:
After determining the client’s immigration status and potential adverse
consequences from the criminal proceedings, including removal,

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. Standard 4-5.1(e).
Compare id. Standard 4-5.1(b), with id. Standard 4-5.1(e).
Id. Standard 4-5.4(a).
Compare id., with id. Standard 4-5.1(e).
Id. Standard 4-5.5(b).
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exclusion, bars to relief from removal, immigration detention, denial of
citizenship, and adverse consequences to the client’s immediate
family, counsel should advise the client of all such potential
consequences and determine with the client the best course of action
for the client’s interests and how to pursue it. 113

As with Standard 4-5.4, counsel cannot measure up to this Standard
when resolving cases via arraignment guilty pleas.
F. Disposition Without Trial
1. Standard 4-6.2: Negotiated Disposition Discussions
Section (d) of Standard 4-6.2 states the following: “Defense counsel
should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a disposition
without appropriate investigation. Before accepting or advising a
disposition, defense counsel should request that the prosecution disclose
any information that tends to negate guilt, mitigates the offense or is
likely to reduce punishment.”114
As with Standard 4-6.1, counsel is admonished not to recommend
acceptance of a guilty plea unless having engaged in appropriate
investigation, including seeking any and all exculpatory information
from the prosecution.115 Given that the prosecution at first appearance
may well be unaware of the existence of any such information, this
Standard also does not contemplate speedy guilty pleas.
III. THE ABA PLEAS OF GUILTY STANDARDS
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice include a separate volume
devoted specifically to guilty pleas, aptly named the “Pleas of Guilty”
Standards.116 Although these Standards have not been revised in
nearly twenty years,117 any study of the ethics of guilty pleas at
arraignments must include an examination of that volume and whether
the Standards therein are consistent with the newly revised Defense
Function Standards.

113. Id. Standard 4-5.5(c).
114. Id. Standard 4-5.5(d).
115. Compare id. Standard 4-6.1, with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (regarding
the prosecution’s obligation to provide evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or
punishment).
116. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY (AM. BAR ASS’N 1999).
117. Given the Supreme Court’s recent attention to plea bargaining, it behooves the ABA to
reevaluate and revise these Standards.
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What follows is a chronological analysis of the Pleas of Guilty
Standards as they apply to meet, greet, and plead, and how they relate to
the revised Defense Function Standards.118 Unlike the extant Defense
Function Standards, the current edition of the Pleas of Guilty Standards
includes an overall introduction and the history and commentary relative
to each specific standard.119
A. Introduction to the Standards
The Pleas of Guilty Standards includes the following introduction:
In the twenty years since these standards were last considered, the
context in which guilty pleas are negotiated and entered has changed
in important ways. . . . [T]he collateral consequences of convictions,
including guilty pleas, have increased dramatically . . . . This
has diminished the significance of the distinction between pleading
guilty to a felony or a misdemeanor, as the latter may also carry
significant future consequences for the defendant.120

This language highlights the explosion of collateral consequences
and recognizes that the potential harm is not limited to “serious”
charges. This speaks squarely to the rampant pleas at arraignments to socalled “lesser” offenses, and calls into question the language in Defense
Function Standard 4-3.3(b) regarding “simple and routine cases.”121
Moreover, “[a]s the direct and collateral consequences of guilty
pleas have increased, practices in this area have likewise changed and
evolved. . . . The importance of defense counsel’s role in advising his or
her client has grown—as has the difficulty of fulfilling that task . . . .”122
As the potential devastating impact of a guilty plea has expanded,
counsel’s advice-giving function has never been more important or more
difficult. Fulfilling this vital function requires more than one, brief initial
client interview.

118. See infra Parts III–IV.
119. Compare STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION, with
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY intro. As of this writing, the corresponding
introduction, history, and commentary for the Defense Function Standards are still being drafted.
See Defense Function, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/
DefenseFunctionFourthEdition-TableofContents.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
120. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY intro. at xi.
121. Compare id. intro. at xi-xii, with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION &
DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.3(b).
122. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY intro. at xi.
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The introduction also considers the impact of guilty pleas on the
public’s perception of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system:
[T]he broad reliance of the criminal justice system on guilty pleas as a
means of resolving cases has increased the importance of such
resolutions. Guilty pleas also continue to have a significant effect in
shaping public perceptions of the criminal justice system. Given the
dominance of this mode of conviction, public confidence in the fair
and effective administration of justice requires that the plea process
itself be viewed as legitimate.123

Over the course of many years, through agencies like the former
United States Information Agency, I have had the opportunity to guide
foreign dignitaries on tours of the New York City criminal courts. In
every case, after observing a few hours of arraignments and numerous
swiftly entered guilty pleas, there were abundant questions raised about
due process, right to counsel, and jury trials. Locally, I have escorted
corporate law members of the Bar Association through the criminal
court and they voiced similar concerns. There is ample and obvious
evidence that the practice of meet, greet, and plead most certainly does
not engender public confidence in the fair administration of justice, quite
to the contrary.
1. Development of the Third Edition Standards
This “Edition seeks to clarify the roles, and responsibilities, of
the . . . defense attorney . . . . In addition, the proposed Standards include
refinements of the role of . . . defense counsel . . . .”124
This language makes clear that one of the explicitly stated purposes
of this edition of the Pleas of Guilty Standards was to clarify and refine
counsel’s role specifically with respect to guilty pleas.125
2. Philosophy of the Guilty Plea Standards
The philosophy underlying the Guilty Plea Standards includes the
following: “The procedures for negotiation of plea agreements, and for
the acceptance of guilty . . . pleas, should be designed to ensure that the
defendant is provided with the information and legal advice necessary to
make an informed and voluntary plea.”126

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. intro. at xii.
Id. intro. at xiii.
See id.
Id.
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It is hard to seriously argue that arraignment pleas are informed
and voluntary and based on anything beyond the bare minimum of
legal advice and information. Further, “[t]he objective of the [Guilty
Plea Standards] is . . . to formulate procedures that will maximize the
fairness of the process and the likelihood that the defendant has
entered such a plea knowingly and voluntarily, fully understanding
the consequences.”127
Taken together, the philosophy and objective of the Pleas of Guilty
Standards reflect noble and critical goals ensuring that any guilty plea is
based on information and legal advice sufficient to maximize the
fairness of the process such that any guilty plea is informed, voluntary,
knowing, and with full understanding of all the consequences. To fulfill
these goals, counsel should not recommend, but should actively advise
against entering, a guilty plea at arraignments.
B. Black-Letter Pleas of Guilty Standards: Receiving and
Acting upon the Plea
1. Standard 14-1.3: Aid of Counsel; Time for Deliberation
Section (a) of Standard 14-1.3 states “[a] defendant should not
be called upon to plead until . . . counsel has been appointed . . . . A
defendant with counsel should not be required to enter a plea if
counsel makes a reasonable request for additional time to represent
the defendant’s interests.”128
The commentary for Standard 14-1.3(a) provides the following:
Such a provision, similarly, is necessary as a constitutional and
practical matter. Just as a defendant is denied the effective assistance
of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment if counsel is not
afforded an adequate opportunity to prepare for trial, a violation of the
Sixth Amendment may also occur where a defendant is called upon to
plead but his or her counsel has not had sufficient chance to engage in
plea discussions with the prosecuting attorney. Moreover, it is seldom
possible to engage in effective negotiations minutes before the
defendant is called upon to plead. Instead, a reasonable interval should
elapse between assignment of counsel and the pleading stage.
Allowing for such “additional time” will permit plea discussions to go
forward, where appropriate, and will also provide the time necessary

127. Id. intro. at xvi.
128. Id. Standard 14-1.3(a).
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for legal and factual investigation and for client-counsel discussions as
to what plea would be most appropriate.129

As elucidated in the commentary, this Standard, without
specifically referencing arraignment pleas, seems to speak directly to the
issues they raise. It calls, clearly and simply, for time—time for defense
counsel to adequately represent his or her client’s interests.130 By stating
that “it is seldom possible to engage in effective negotiations minutes
before the defendant is called upon to plead,” the commentary calls out
and disapproves the exact type of “negotiations” that characterize
arraignments.131 It is particularly noteworthy that there is a direct
reference to the constitutional right to effective assistance to highlight
the importance of time.132 The commentary presents a stark contrast to
Defense Function Standard 4-5.1 that capitulates to and accepts time
constraints on counsel’s ability to investigate and to advise.133
2. Standard 14-1.4: Defendant To Be Advised
This Standard provides a lengthy laundry list of all the “advice” the
court must give to the defendant before accepting a plea.134 It obviously
presupposes that defense counsel has informed and discussed with her
client all the listed items (for example, nature and elements of
the offense; maximum possible sentence; the many constitutional rights
the defendant is waiving by pleading guilty; and potential
collateral consequences).
The commentary provides as follows:
Ordinarily, the primary burden to ensure that the defendant is aware of
any collateral consequences that may apply in his or her case must fall
on the defense counsel. A new provision outlining this responsibility
has also been included in Standard 14-3.2, governing the duties of
defense counsel. It is also appropriate that the court take a role in this
area, however, because of the number and extent of such collateral
effects, which may be critical considerations to an individual defendant
in deciding whether to enter a plea. In some cases, the collateral
129. Id. Standard 14-1.3(a) cmt. at 27 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 71 (1932); then citing State v. Borchert, 934 P.2d 170 (Mont. 1997); and then citing In re
Hawley, 433 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1967)).
130. See id. Standard 14-1.3(a) cmt. at 26.
131. Id. Standard 14-1.3(a) cmt. at 27.
132. See id.
133. Compare id., with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE
FUNCTION Standard 4-5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
134. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-1.4 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 1999).
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consequences may be far disproportionate to the direct effects of the
conviction itself.135

The clear message from the Standard and corresponding
commentary is that defense counsel must devote considerable time and
attention to client interviews in order to effectively counsel her clients
about the myriad consequences that may flow from a plea.
C. Plea Discussions and Plea Agreements
Standard 14-3.2, Responsibilities of Defense Counsel section (b)
provides the following:
To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after
appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the
alternatives available and address considerations deemed important by
defense counsel or the defendant in reaching a decision. Defense
counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a
plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has
been completed.136

Section (f) states, “To the extent possible, defense counsel should
determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry
of any plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue
from entry of the contemplated plea.”137
1. History of Standard 14-3.2
“Subsection (b) has been amended to include language making
clear that defense counsel ‘should not recommend to a defendant
acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the
case has been completed.’”138
The fact that this Standard was specifically amended to “mak[e]
clear” that counsel should not recommend acceptance of a plea “unless
appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed”
speaks volumes about the obligation of counsel to engage in adequate
investigation prior to providing advice.139
In addition, “[n]ew subsection (f) is included, concerning defense
counsel’s duty, to the extent possible, to advise the client in advance of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. Standard 14-1.4 cmt. at 59-60.
Id. Standard 14-3.2(b).
Id. Standard 14-3.2(f).
Id. Standard 14-3.2 hist. at 117.
Id.
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the entry of any guilty plea concerning the ‘possible collateral
consequences that might ensue from the entry of the contemplated
guilty plea.’”140
Here is one of the few places where the Pleas of Guilty Standards
send conflicting messages. Use of the phrase “to the extent possible” in
regard to counsel’s advice concerning potential collateral consequences
is confusing, troubling, and inconsistent with the emphasis in the
commentary to Standard 14-1.3(a) on making sure counsel has the time
she needs to adequately advise her clients.141
2. Commentary of Standard 14-3.2
The commentary of Standard 14-3.2 provides the purpose of
this Standard:
Standard 14-3.2 addresses the responsibilities of defense counsel in
connection with the process of negotiating and entering a plea of
guilty . . . . This is a critical standard because the system relies, at
heart, on a defense counsel to ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea
is truly knowing and voluntary and is entered in his or her
best interests.142

Recognizing the central role guilty pleas play in the criminal justice
system, the commentary highlights that it is “critical” for defense
counsel to guarantee that her clients’ guilty pleas are truly knowing and
voluntary.143 That, by definition, presupposes that all advice given is
based on factual and legal investigation, and that the client has had
sufficient time to weigh all options. However, the commentary
acknowledges the following:
This standard is not, of course, intended to be a comprehensive list of
all of defense counsel’s duties to the client, which are set out fully in
the ABA Standards on the Defense Function and which should be read
in conjunction with these standards. Rather, they are intended more
narrowly, to address the particular duties that defense counsel has in
connection with the negotiation and entry of guilty pleas, and advising
the client in connection therewith.144

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Compare id. Standard 14-1.3 cmt. at 27, with id. Standard 14-3.2(f).
Id. Standard 14-3.2 cmt. at 117.
Id.
Id. Standard 14-3.2 cmt. at 118.
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Since we are instructed that the Pleas of Guilty Standards should be
read “in conjunction” with the Defense Function Standards,145 it is
imperative that the Standards are not in conflict. The Pleas of Guilty
Standards more explicitly disapprove arraignment pleas. The Defense
Function Standards should follow suit.
The Pleas of Guilty Standards provide that “[t]he obligations
reflected in . . . Standard 14-3.2(b) . . . concern[] defense counsel’s duty
to provide effective assistance of counsel to the defendant.”146
By using “effective assistance” language, the commentary signals
that these obligations are constitutional, as well as ethical.
The commentary also suggests the following:
By necessity, defense counsel is charged with the primary
responsibility to ensure that the defendant fully understands the plea
that is being offered, including all terms of the sentence that could be
imposed and other ramifications of that plea.
Given the importance of this decision for the defendant and the
defendant’s family, and the serious and lasting collateral consequences
that may flow from the conviction, defense counsel is, in effect, acting
as a fiduciary for the client. The obligation to communicate with a
criminal client in this situation is not simply a formal one that may be
satisfied in each particular case by giving a client a rote checklist of
factors worth considering in deciding whether to plead guilty. In
evaluating the information necessary to provide meaningful advice
prior to a plea, individualized consideration should be given to such
factors as the particular circumstances of the defendant, the particular
offense(s) at issue, the level and quality of the defendant’s education
and cognition, the client’s familiarity with the legal system, and the
like. This presupposes that counsel has a duty to conduct a sufficient
investigation to understand the unique issues that confront each client
and the client’s particular concerns. Such inquiries may be difficult
when the defendant’s English language skills are poor, and counsel
may require the assistance of a translator both to ask the necessary
questions and to convey the requisite information for a fully informed
guilty plea.147

This language leaves little doubt that the Standard presupposes that
counsel engage in personalized and thorough factual and legal
investigation prior to giving plea advice.

145. Id.
146. Id. Standard 14-3.2(a) cmt. at 118-19.
147. Id. Standard 14-3.2(a) cmt. at 120.
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Standard 14-3.2(b) concerns defense counsel’s duty adequately to
“advise” the defendant concerning the plea decision. As part of the
third edition, this provision has been expanded explicitly to include the
duty of defense counsel to conduct “appropriate investigation and
study” of the case before recommending acceptance of a plea offer.
This advice should, of course, include discussion of any affirmative
defenses that may be available to the defendant. 148

The commentary highlights, as did the history, that this Standard
was “expanded explicitly” to address counsel’s duty “to conduct
‘appropriate investigation and study’ of the case before recommending
acceptance of a plea offer.”149 The point that investigation is a
precondition to providing advice could not be more clearly made.
As a matter of constitutional law, a plea is not deemed voluntary and
intelligent “if the advice given by defense counsel on which the
defendant relied in entering the plea falls below the level of reasonable
competence such that the defendant does not receive effective
assistance of counsel.”150

Once again, the intentional reference to constitutional requirements
in the context of ethical duties is particularly noteworthy:
It should be emphasized that this Standard requires counsel to do more
than the constitutional minimum; it mandates that a defendant should
be informed fully by defense counsel and provided with a realistic
appraisal of the value of any concessions offered by the prosecutor.151

To the extent one engages in a constitutional versus ethical
analysis, the commentary makes clear that the Standard sets a
higher bar:
Equally important, Standard 14-3.2(b) recognizes defense counsel’s
duty to investigate the case before recommending acceptance of a
guilty plea. It provides that defense counsel “should not recommend to
a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and
study of the case has been completed.” In most cases, an “appropriate”
investigation will include not only an analysis of controlling law and
the evidence likely to be introduced at trial, but also consideration of
any applicable discovery rules, and a determination whether it would

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. Standard 14-3.2(b) cmt. at 120.
Id. Standard 14-3.2 hist. at 116-17, cmt. at 120.
Id. Standard 14-3.2(b) cmt. at 120-21.
Id. Standard 14-3.2(b) cmt. at 122.
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be preferable to seek particular items of discovery before negotiating
a plea.
....
Defense counsel’s duty to conduct an “appropriate investigation”
thus includes the duty to be familiar with, and enforce the defendant’s
rights under, any discovery rules that may apply in the jurisdiction.
Defense counsel should use these avenues, among others, to conduct
an appropriate investigation of the case before advising the defendant
concerning a possible guilty plea. In conducting such an investigation,
it is defense counsel’s responsibility to investigate not only the facts
concerning the offense, but also facts that go to the defendant’s
potential sentence, including his or her prior record.
While defense counsel generally has a duty to seek crucial items of
discovery before plea negotiations are completed, there may be some
cases in which defense counsel legitimately determines that a better
plea agreement may be available if the defendant enters a plea at a
point in time before all of his or her discovery rights may apply. Thus,
an “appropriate” investigation may be quite limited in certain cases-for
example, where a highly favorable pre-indictment plea is offered, and
the pleas offered after indictment are likely to carry significantly more
severe sentences.152

These three paragraphs spell out in greater detail the types of
factual and legal investigations envisioned as conditions precedent
before defense counsel should recommend that her client accept a guilty
plea offer.153 Unlike the new Defense Function Standard 4-6.1(b), the
Pleas of Guilty Standard 14-3.2, history, and commentary are silent on
the question of when a lawyer should affirmatively advise a client to
reject a guilty plea offer.154
While the commentary acknowledges that in “some” cases
“‘appropriate’ investigation may be ‘quite limited,’” the example used
refers to a situation where investigation via discovery is not fully
completed.155 That is a far cry from situations where counsel enters a
guilty plea after only having met her clients for a few minutes prior to
the plea. The commentary also notes that,
Standard 14-3.2(f) . . . requires defense counsel, “sufficiently in
advance of the entry of any plea,” to determine and advise the
152. Id. Standard 14-3.2(b) cmt. at 123.
153. See id.
154. Compare STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 5-6.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015), with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF
GUILTY Standard 14-3.2 cmt. at 116-32.
155. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY Standard 14-3.2 cmt. at 123.
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defendant as to “the possible collateral consequences that might ensue
from entry of the contemplated plea.” While the standards always
required defense counsel to advise his or her client concerning other
considerations “deemed important by defense counsel or the
defendant” (Standard 14-3.2(b)), the number and significance of
potential collateral consequences has grown to such an extent that it is
important to have a separate standard that addresses this obligation.
....
Given the ever-increasing host of collateral consequences that may
flow from a plea of guilty . . . it may be very difficult for defense
counsel to fully brief every client on every likely effect of a plea in all
circumstances. Courts do not require such an expansive debriefing in
order to validate a guilty plea. This Standard, however, strives to set an
appropriately high standard, providing that defense counsel should be
familiar with, and advise defendants of, all of the possible effects
of conviction.156

The specific inclusion of obligations regarding collateral
consequences reflects a recognition of all that is required before defense
counsel is in a position to offer ethical, and constitutionally effective,
advice. The commentary recognizes that although it might be hard to
fully brief every client on every likely effect, the Standard strives to set a
high bar.
IV.

ON THE GROUND DEVELOPMENTS

Some Public Defender offices, courts, and state bar ethics
committees are taking matters into their own hands.
In 2005, Howard Finkelstein, the Public Defender in Broward
County, Florida, prohibited his lawyers from advising clients to plead
guilty at arraignment, emphasizing that plea advice had to be preceded
by “meaningful contact” between lawyer and client.157
Similarly, in St. Louis, Missouri, the Public Defender called
representation of certain misdemeanor defendants “unethical,
unprofessional and unconstitutional,” and decided his office would no
longer automatically represent defendants at their initial court
appearance on misdemeanor charges.158 In particular, he decried the lack

156. Id. Standard 14-3.2(f) cmt. at 125-26.
157. See Dan Christensen, Broward PD Says No to Instant Plea Deals, DAILY BUS. REV., June
6, 2005, at 1; see also Geri L. Dreiling, ‘Meet-and-Greet Pleas’ Not Good Enough, A.B.A. J.
EREPORT, June 24, 2005.
158. Patrick, supra note 74 (quoting St. Louis District Defender Eric Affholter).
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of discovery, investigation, and time for meaningful consultation with
the client before plea offers were made and accepted.159
In 2013, the Public Defender in Florida filed motions seeking to be
relieved of the obligation to represent indigent defendants in non-capital
felony cases.160 The crux of the motion alleged that excessive caseloads
prevented staff attorneys from meeting their legal and ethical obligations
to their clients.161 The court ruled in the Public Defender’s favor and
remanded the case for further proceedings:
Witnesses from the Public Defender’s office described “meet and greet
pleas” as being routine procedure. The assistant public defender meets
the defendant for the first time at arraignment during a few minutes in
the courtroom or hallway and knows nothing about the case except for
the arrest form provided by the state attorney, yet is expected to
counsel the defendant about the State’s plea offer. In this regard, the
public defenders serve “as mere conduits for plea offers.”162

A recent ethical opinion from the Pennsylvania Bar Association
also expressly rejected “meet and greet” pleas.163 That opinion addressed
the ethics of an “early accountability” plea program that compelled
defense attorneys to recommend guilty pleas to their clients before they
had received any discovery or done any investigation.164 The opinion
states that the program forced defense lawyers to violate rules of
professional conduct, particularly the obligation to investigate the facts,
examine the evidence, and explore possible defense and mitigation.165
That is precisely the issue with guilty pleas at the accused’s initial
appearance. Just as the Pennsylvania State Bar found the practice to be
an ethical violation, so too should the American Bar Association.
V.

CONCLUSION

To be sure, many arraignment pleas are to reduced charges and
noncriminal violations/offenses, but in the current era of massive
159. See id.
160. Pub. Def. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 2013).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 278. The characterization of arraignment guilty pleas as “routine procedures” flies
directly in the face of ABA Defense Function Standard 4-3.7(f) that urges defense counsel to avoid
“simply follow[ing] rote procedures.” Compare id., with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-3.7(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
163. See Pa. Bar Ass’n, Inquiry No. 2014-026 (2014); see also Samson Habte, Plea Program
Altered After Ethics Opinion But Critics’ Constitutional Challenge Looms, 95 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA)
650-51 (2004).
164. Pa. Bar Ass’n, Inquiry No. 2014-026, at 1-2, 4-6.
165. Id. at 4-6.
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collateral consequences, even these types of pleas have drastic
consequences for the accused and merit more time and attention than
typically afforded as part of an arraignment disposition.166 It is welldocumented that misdemeanor and even non-criminal offenses can lead
to deportation, eviction, inability to obtain loans or licenses, etcetera.167
And no doubt many defense attorneys say that their clients often
insist upon accepting a plea offer because they can’t miss work to come
back to court or have family obligations that lead to the same result.168
However, eschewing meet, greet, and plead dispositions does not mean
that the accused must come back to court over and over—there is no
impediment to the accused accepting a plea on the very next court date, a
time by which he’s been able to get some rest, shower, eat, and talk with
family and friends before making this decision. Otherwise, the “clearly
in the client’s best interest” proviso in the new Standard will easily
swallow the “rule” against arraignment guilty pleas.169
Of course, arraignment pleas are part of a larger conversation about
criminal justice. While I have focused my attention on defense counsel’s
role, it is also the case that judges and prosecutors need to rethink their
power and prominent roles vis-à-vis pleas at arraignments. Prosecutors
should abstain from “one time only” plea offers so as not to, in effect,
cause defense counsel to violate her ethical obligations (and provide
ineffective assistance).170 As is written in the Introduction to the Pleas of
Guilty Standards, “while it is not unconstitutional for prosecutors to seek
to induce defendants to plead guilty, these standards recognize that
defendants should have a right to go to trial, and as a matter of sound
criminal justice policy, should not be unduly pressured to forego
that right.”171
Similarly, judges should avoid tying plea decisions to bail
determinations172 and strictly adhere to the practices and policies spelled
166. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 34.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 32.
169. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 46.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
170. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that
prosecutors often exert pressure in the form of “one time only” offers to induce defendants to enter
guilty pleas at their initial court appearance); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving”
Goodbye to Rights: Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation,
38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1041 (2011).
171. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY intro. at xv (AM. BAR ASS’N
1999).
172. Klein, supra note 2, at 211-12 (stating that many judges use the threat of bail to coerce
defendants into pleading guilty at their initial court appearance).
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out in detail in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial
Release.173 As urged in the Pleas of Guilty Standards, “prosecutors and
judges should keep in mind that the defendant always has a right to
plead not guilty and to choose to go to trial. Neither should seek to
compromise or threaten that right.”174
Ideally, state laws or administrative rules would be such that pleas
were not jurisdictionally permissible at arraignment. In fact, that is the
case in many jurisdictions across the country—there are no guilty pleas
at arraignment and those court systems function as well, if not better,
than courts that do permit, or even encourage, arraignment pleas.
While there are many parts to the arraignment plea discussion, the
immediate issue is to define defense counsel’s proper role in the
Standards. But even as I focus for now on defense counsel, it is
important to note that ending the practice of arraignment pleas will
inevitably lead to more facts, details, and insights about the charges—
everyone would be better served. Defense counsel will be able to meet
their ethical and constitutional duties, prosecutors will be able to learn
which cases are more or less serious and substantiated, and judges will
have more information from which to make decisions. And, of course,
the accused will have the opportunity to carefully and thoughtfully
consider his or her options.
It is also the case that seemingly “simple” or “routine” cases often
are actually factually and legally complicated and merit careful attention.
In New York, we have seen the ways that early guilty pleas masked
ongoing constitutional problems with disorderly conduct,175 trespass,176
and marijuana arrests,177 not to mention the ways that Equal Protection
and Fourth Amendment stop-and-frisk violations178 were shielded from
view amid rampant guilty pleas entered in hurried, hushed tones.
Many people familiar with the criminal court contend that
arraignment pleas are no big deal; that concerns about meet, greet, and
173. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
174. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY intro. at xvi.
175. See People v. Jones, 878 N.E.2d 1016, 1017-19 (N.Y. 2007); Nicholas Confessore, A
Times Square Pedestrian Is Giving No Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at B1.
176. See J. David Goodman, Police Patrols in Projects Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2014, at A1; Cara Buckley, Lawsuit Takes Aim at Trespassing Arrests in New York Public Housing,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/nyregion/30housing.html.
177. See Elizabeth A. Harris, Police Memo on Marijuana Warns Against Some Arrests, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2011, at A15; Brendan Cheney, Marijuana Arrests in City Increased in 2016, with
Large Racial Disparities, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2017, 5:31 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/newyork/city-hall/story/2017/02/marijuana-arrests-in-nyc-increase-in-2016-still-large-racial-disparities109306.
178. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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plead make mountains out of mole hills. These institutional players
argue that the charges that result in arraignment guilty pleas are minor
and routine so that in-depth interviews and factual and legal
investigations are not required.179 That attitude is cavalier as well as
reckless. With the explosion of collateral consequences there are
precious few “safe” guilty pleas. Even a guilty plea to a something like a
non-criminal marijuana offense can result in the loss of federal student
loans.180 Many seemingly minor violations can lead to deportation, and
countless others impact licenses and government benefits.
Even guilty pleas that seem to be safe today may become
disastrous tomorrow—just consider the recent changes in immigration
deportation enforcement.
Court administrators argue that arraignment pleas are a necessary
evil; that the system would collapse under the weight of all the cases that
now would enter the courts.181 But similar resource arguments were
made against providing counsel in Gideon182 and again when the right to
counsel was extended in Argersinger.183 The constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel should not give way to concerns about
resources. Gideon and Argersinger provide the right to counsel.184 The
critical question addressed by the Standards, and likely to be addressed
with renewed vigor by the Supreme Court in light of Padilla, Lafler, and
Frye, is “what are those lawyers actually doing with respect to guilty
pleas, especially guilty pleas at initial appearance?”
Ultimately, meet, greet, and plead is a reflection of American
criminal justice writ large. Much has been written about the ways the
criminal justice system works to keep under foot those communities that
are already subordinated.185 It is hard to imagine a system of rapid guilty
pleas inflicted on anyone other than people of color. Contrast the time
and attention paid to all kinds of white collar prosecutions in federal
court no matter how complicated or serious the facts and charges. To the
people involved in those cases, the notion of a guilty plea entered
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181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Sean C. Gallagher, A Judge’s Comments, 42 LITIG. 21, 21, 23 (2015).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2012).
See Gallagher, supra note 179, at 21, 23.
See Brief for Respondent at 50, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155).
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36-37, 37 n.7 (1972).
Id. at 36-37; Gideon, 371 U.S. at 339-40.
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 188 (2012); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21-22 (1999); BRYAN
STEVENSON, JUST MERCY 300 (2015); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND
REDEMPTION 300-01 (2014); SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY,
AND CRIME IN AMERICA 137 (6th ed. 2016).
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without benefit of thorough investigation, advice, and time to weigh
alternatives is inconceivable.
Perhaps the best way to think about the issue is what would you
expect if a loved one were arrested for a relatively minor charge? I am
sure you would expect, if not demand, that he or she were given
adequate time to ensure there was fully informed advice and ample time
to consider all the options.
Meet, greet, and plead is a very visible and ingrained stain
on the criminal justice system. The Standards missed a chance to help
remove it.186

186. There is still some hope. The as yet unfinished commentary is a chance to illuminate the
black letter language of the Standards.
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